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It has been shown that abstract concepts aremore difficult to process and are acquired later than concrete concepts.We analysed the
percentage of concrete words in the narrative lexicon of individuals withWilliams Syndrome (WS) as compared to individuals with
Down Syndrome (DS) and typically developing (TD) peers.The cognitive profile ofWS is characterized by visual-spatial difficulties,
while DS presents with predominant impairments in linguistic abilities. We predicted that if linguistic abilities are crucial to the
development and use of an abstract vocabulary, DS participants should display a higher concreteness index than both Williams
Syndrome and typically developing individuals. Results confirm this prediction, thus supporting the hypothesis of a crucial role of
linguistic processes in abstract language acquisition. Correlation analyses suggest that a maturational link exists between the level
of abstractness in narrative production and syntactic comprehension.
1. Introduction
In Locke’s view [1], concepts originate from the need to
categorize and generalize our experience of the world,
as it is easier to process a limited number of categories
than a great number of individual instances. Traditional
psychological theories see concepts as attribute collections
(representations) associated with lexical items, which corre-
spond to objects and events in the world (e.g., [2]). These
representations would be extracted through perceptual and
linguistic experience derived from our interaction with the
world [3–5]. In Quinn and Eimas’ view [6], concepts develop
gradually through a process of quantitative enrichment,
based on perceptual learning. Infants would form a category
representation for a set of entities (e.g., animal or animal-
like) by encountering various individual examples over time
and extracting common physical attributes [7, 8]. Other
authors postulate the existence of supplementary processes
integrating perceptual analysis. Mandler andMcDonough [9,
10], inwhat is usually referred to as a dual-process framework,
suggest that concepts are initially formed by “perceptual
schemas” that define what the objects that fall into each
conceptual category would generally look like. Subsequently,
a second process would produce “image schemas” by extract-
ing dynamic information such as motion, sound, and func-
tion (i.e., categories based on meaning). Other authors (e.g.,
[11]) suggest that perceptual learning is complemented by
inferential mechanisms giving information about function,
intention, and so forth.
All approaches to conceptual development in children
consider sensory (primarily visual) experience as fundamen-
tal to build and represent concepts. Even when inferential
mechanisms are called for, they are usually assumed to
apply to directly experienced elements in the attempt to find
more general categories that include them. However, abstract
concepts do notmeet such requirements, because they do not
stand for any perceivable object. How are concepts such as
knowledge, creativity, justice, science, and happiness formed,
if there are no concrete referents in the world to serve as
examples?
In most studies, abstract knowledge has been considered
mainly by opposition to concrete knowledge, focusing on the
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so-called concreteness effect (i.e., the greater ease and speed
in processing concrete concepts as compared to abstract
concepts) [12–16] or on different contents and network
structures characterizing the two classes of words (e.g., [16,
17]). However, no convergence has been reached about how
abstract concepts are learned and represented.
From an acquisition viewpoint, a set of mechanisms
proposed in the literature might be specifically relevant for
abstract concept formation. For instance, “cross-situational
learning” [18–21] refers to the situation where a child hears
a new word and he/she is assumed to activate a number
of potential meanings for that word from the nonlinguistic
context of the utterance containing that word. When the
same word is heard in several different utterance contexts,
the child can intersect the corresponding sets to find which
meaning is consistent across the different occurrences of that
word. Abstract concept acquisition would mainly depend on
the system’s sensitivity to input distributional features such
as occurrence statistics [22]. Syntactic bootstrapping mecha-
nisms [19, 23, 24]may also play a role as it has been shown that
syntactic structure helps narrowing the search space for verb
meaning. Another set of theories, on the contrary, emphasize
the role of sensory-motor experience also in the acquisition
of abstract knowledge, in a sort of simulated or situated expe-
rience involving abstract concepts [25–27]. Neuroimaging
studies seem to reflect the samemultiplicity of views. A recent
meta-analysis of 19 neuroimaging studies compared the pro-
cessing of abstract and concrete concepts across various tasks
and found that left inferior frontal, superior temporal, and
middle temporal cortices were more active for abstract than
for concrete concepts across studies [28]. Concrete concepts,
by contrast, activated the posterior cingulate, precuneus,
fusiform gyrus, and parahippocampal gyrus. This suggested
that abstract concepts rely on verbal systems, whereas con-
crete concepts rely on perceptual systems supporting mental
imagery (see also [29]), contrasting with other studies show-
ing activation of motor areas or, more recently, distributed
neural systems representing concept-specific content [30, 31]
during the processing of abstract expressions. Many of these
studies are thus consistent with the prediction of the dual
coding model showing that the right hemisphere is indeed
more activated by concrete than abstract words [32] or that
concrete versus abstract words activate a distributed, bilateral
semantic memory system [33, 34]. A similar dissociation is
reported in studies of patients showing greater impairments
for concrete words than abstract words following bilateral
or unilateral ventral temporal lesions (e.g., [35]) or showing
greater impairment for abstract words following left perisyl-
vian damage (e.g., [36]).
Children with Down Syndrome (DS) and children with
Williams Syndrome (WS) offer a unique opportunity to
study the development of abstract versus concrete language.
Williams Syndrome (WS) is a rare, genetically based neu-
rodevelopmental disorder caused by the deletion of one copy
of a small set of genes on chromosome 7 (7q11.23). Children
with WS are characterized by major visual-spatial and con-
structional impairments [37, 38] accompanied by close-to-
normal, though not fully intact linguistic skills [39, 40]. More
specifically, no deficits in phonetic and phonological skills
are usually reported, with good short-term memory skills
[39], and their speech is described as fluid [41] and lexically
rich (e.g., [42], but see [43, 44], or [45] for more detailed
reviews of the neuropsychological data). The frequent use of
uncommon terms is often reported (e.g., [46]), although no
systematic distinction has been made between abstract and
concrete ones. Mervis and Morris [47] actually reported that
children with WS present with a specific weakness in the use
of relational terms, not limited to spatial terms and thus not
directly consequent to their impairment in spatial abilities.
The authors also suggest that this impairment may be linked
to the structural abnormalities found [45] for WS in what
Walsh [48] called the “common magnitude system,” an area
partially located in the inferior parietal cortex and controlling
spatial, temporal, and quantitative processing.
Down Syndrome (DS) is a chromosome abnormality
caused by trisomy of chromosome 21 and children affected
by this syndrome are mainly characterized by severe lin-
guistic impairments, with relatively spared visual-spatial
and visual memory skills [49–51]. The delay in linguistic
development appears to be more evident for morphological
and syntactic skills than for lexical-semantic skills [42, 52,
53], although a general linguistic impairment is usually
reported [54]. Among lexical skills, a dissociation has been
reported between receptive and productive vocabulary, with
the former being relatively more preserved than the latter
[55]. Nonetheless, even at the receptive level, that is usually
described as a relative strength for individuals with DS,
difficulties have been observed with the comprehension of
abstract relational terms such as between, separated, and
equal [56]. Chapman and colleagues [57] further showed that
adolescents with DS produce a lower number of total words,
and a more limited variety of different words, if compared
to TD controls matched on mental age. This reduction is not
accounted for by limitations in language production overall,
since adolescents with DS produce even more utterances
(yet, less clearly intelligible) in the time unit as compared to
controls. In spite of their length (MLU mostly above 3 in the
adolescents who participated in the study), utterances in the
DS group were characterized by a large number of omissions,
essentially regarding function words [57]. No direct com-
parison in productive lexicon between concrete and abstract
nouns is reported in any of the above studies, but Chapman et
al.’s [58] finding of the predictive value of receptive vocabulary
with respect to productive vocabulary suggests that concrete
words are likely to be more represented than abstract ones
and that these differences may be larger for individuals with
DS than for the typically developing population.
Altogether, then, children with DS are characterized by
predominant impairments in linguistic computational skills
but relatively preserved visual-spatial abilities, while children
with WS present with visual-spatial impairments but better
preserved linguistic skills [59, 60]. Both groups appear to have
more impaired comprehension and production of abstract
(use of relational terms in the above-mentioned studies)
vocabulary as compared to concrete vocabulary; however, no
systematic comparison of the two types of lexical production
(especially if focusing on spontaneous production rather than
naming or recalling and on open-class abstract language
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production rather than function words) between the two
clinical populations has been conducted, to our knowledge.
Beyond descriptive aims, the neuroanatomical features
of the two populations allow testing the role of different
neural networks suggested to be involved in the processing of
abstract and concrete words. In fact, Williams Syndrome was
shown to have decreased overall brain and cerebral volumes,
relative preservation of cerebellar and superior temporal
gyrus (STG) volumes, and a reduction of right occipital areas,
resulting in a greater ratio of frontal to posterior (parietal and
occipital) tissue [61]. On the other hand, Down Syndrome
neuroanatomy is characterized by reductions in gray matter
(GM) tissue in the cerebellum, cingulate gyrus, left medial
frontal lobe, and right middle/superior temporal gyrus [62].
It was shown in previous studies [63] that individuals with
WS are as sensitive to phonological similarity and concrete-
ness effects in memory tasks as typically developing children.
This suggests that the acquisition of abstract terms in WS
follows typical pathways (although with slower rhythms),
in spite of limitations in visual-spatial skills. Based on such
data, together with the expectations that descend from the
neuroanatomical and neurofunctional characteristics of the
two clinical populations, we could predict that children with
WS should outperform children with DS matched on mental
age in the use of abstract terms and at the same time show
a more limited concrete concept repertoire. Since, however,
neuroimaging data and studies of brain-damaged patients
are almost exclusively based on analyses of vocabulary
comprehension, lexical decision, word repetition, or word
retrieval, with few existing studies on lexical production, a
study on vocabulary production could add new evidence to
our understanding of the neural and cognitive substrates of
abstract thinking. Moreover, the use of a highly ecological
testing procedure tapping narrative production could provide
valuable information with respect to everyday language use
in meaningful contexts for children and for individuals with
intellectual disabilities. Indeed, picture story retellings have
been widely employed to trace the trajectories of language
development in a variety of typically developing and clinical
populations (see, e.g., [64]), and they are considered to be
particularly valuable to elicit descriptions of mental states
and intentions [65, 66], which can prove very helpful for the
assessment of abstract vocabulary.
2. Methods
2.1. Experimental Design. Since experience is also likely to be
involved in conceptual acquisition, we aimed atmatchingWS
and DS participants on mental age (MA) (calculated on the
basis of full-scale IQ on the Wechsler scales) as well as on
chronological age (CA). Further, each of the clinical groups
was compared to a younger group of typically developing
children (TD) of the same MA. In this comparison, WS
and DS children should be more impaired than TD children
in visual-spatial and linguistic skills, respectively. Such a
contrast allows a tighter control of atypical development
trajectories in the neuropsychological development of clinical
groups.
No simultaneous match on both CA and MA between
children with DS and WS was possible though, due to a
Table 1: Characteristics of participants with Williams Syndrome.
WS CA MA IQ L-Sem Synt Comp Prod a b
WS1 16.11 8.3 49 11.5 5.26 9 8.1 ∗ ∗
WS2 13.4 5.10 44 5 4.75 4.25 5.5 ∗ ∗
WS3 18.7 7.2 48 9.5 3.98 8.12 5.35 ∗
WS4 8.2 4 49 9 5.37 8.25 6.12 ∗ ∗
WS5 10.7 5.5 52 5.12 3.87 5 4 ∗ ∗
WS6 12 7.2 60 11.5 7.62 11.5 7.62 ∗ ∗
WS7 15.7 7.7 50 8.12 6.62 9.25 5.5 ∗ ∗
WS8 17.6 9.5 54 9.2 9.46 12 6.71 ∗
WS9 13.9 6.4 47 8.4 4.25 8.25 4.37 ∗
WS10 11.6 8.2 71 9 5.62 8 6.62 ∗
WS11 15.1 7.6 50 10.8 6.37 10.25 6.87 ∗
WS12 11.6 5.7 49 3.8 5.5 3.62 5.62 ∗
WS13 14.4 7.1 51 10.2 5.12 7.75 7.62 ∗ ∗
Mean 13.7 6.8 51.8 8.5 5.7 8.1 6.16
SD 2.9 1.5 6.9 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.2
CA = chronological age; MA =mental age; IQ = intelligence quotient; L-Sem
= lexical-semantic competence (age equivalent); Synt = syntactic competence
(age equivalent); Comp = linguistic comprehension skills (age equivalent);
Prod = linguistic production skills (age equivalent); a = participants selected
for the match on CA; b = participants selected for the match on MA.
generally greater intellectual impairment in the DS group
as compared to the WS group. Therefore, we performed the
following four different comparisons:
(a) DS and WS participants matched on CA
(b) DS and WS participants matched on MA
(c) DS and TD participants matched on MA
(d) WS and TD participants matched on MA
The study was approved by the institute’s Ethical Committee
according to standards of Helsinki Declaration (1964).
2.2. Participants. Seventeen participants with Down Syn-
drome (mean age 12.8, range 8 to 18.4 years) and 13 partici-
pants with Williams Syndrome (mean age 13.8, range 8.2 to
18.7 years) participated in this study (see Tables 1 and 2 for
details).
Participants with WS were in charge at the Research
Institute “E. Medea” in Bosisio Parini, Italy, and had been
positively diagnosed by a geneticist. Participants with a simi-
larly clinically confirmed diagnosis of DSwere recruited from
the Research Institute “E. Medea” in San Vito al Tagliamento,
Italy, and through local patient welfare associations. All
children attended mainstream schools but followed individ-
ualized academic curricula. A group of typically developing
children was recruited in local primary schools. Teachers
described their development as typical. All participants were
native Italian speakers. Informed consent was signed by the
parents of all participants.
Data were collected on a number of different variables.
In order to allow matching of the two groups (WS and DS)
on CA and MA; full-scale IQs as measured by the WISC-
R scale [67, 68] were collected from individual records (in
4 BioMed Research International
Table 2: Characteristics of participants with Down Syndrome.
DS CA MA IQ L-Sem Synt Comp Prod a b
DS1 14.1 6.11 49 11 4.75 8.12 7.62 ∗
DS2 8 5.9 72 3.37 3.37 3.62 3.12 ∗
DS3 14.4 6 43 4.62 4 4.62 4 ∗ ∗
DS4 9.3 5.3 57 9 3.5 5.75 6.75 ∗
DS5 8.10 4.6 51 6.2 3.75 5.87 4.12 ∗
DS6 17 8.4 49 4.62 3 4.37 3.25 ∗ ∗
DS7 15.10 7.9 49 8.5 3.25 5.62 6.12 ∗ ∗
DS8 15.7 5.11 40 8 4.62 6.75 5.87 ∗
DS9 13 6.6 50 5 3.37 4.37 4
DS10 18.4 7.8 42 7.5 3.25 5.25 5.5 ∗
DS11 9.10 4.9 48 5.5 3.62 4.75 4.37
DS12 10.8 4.10 45 5.5 3.12 4.25 4.37 ∗
DS13 12.1 4.4 36 6.5 4.25 6.62 4.12 ∗
DS14 16.11 8.3 49 8.12 4 10.5 4.87 ∗ ∗
DS15 8.8 6.1 70 10.5 3.62 7.25 6.87 ∗
DS16 13.6 6.11 51 5.12 4.62 5.75 4 ∗ ∗
DS17 17.5 6.7 44 4.5 3.25 3.87 3.87 ∗
Mean 13 6.13 49.7 6,4 3,7 5,5 4,7
SD 3.4 1.3 9.4 2,4 0,56 1,8 1,4
CA = chronological age; MA =mental age; IQ = intelligence quotient; L-Sem
= lexical-semantic competence (age equivalent); Synt = syntactic competence
(age equivalent); Comp = linguistic comprehension skills (age equivalent);
Prod = linguistic production skills (age equivalent); a = participants selected
for the match on CA; b = participants selected for the match on MA.
case the test had been administered more than 2 years before
recruitment for the present study, a new test session was
organized). MA was calculated on the base of ad hoc norms
[67, 68].
The mean scores for the WS group were CA = 13.3, MA =
6.9. Scores for the DS group were CA = 12.7, MA = 6.11. Since
no data were available on the control group’s IQ scores, MA
was assumed to be equivalent to CA.
Linguistic performance data were collected using four
tests: Passive Vocabulary (an Italian adaptation of the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) [69]), Naming [70],
Sentence Repetition [71, 72], and syntactic comprehension
(Token Test, reduced version in 21 items [70, 73]). Italian
adaptation and norms were taken from Fabbro [74]. All
results were expressed as age-equivalent scores, based on
standard norms.The scores of the BPVS and the Naming test
were subsequently averaged into an index of lexical-semantic
Competence, whereas scores from Sentence Repetition and
Token test were averaged into an index of syntactic compe-
tence. Further, an average of BPVS and Token test scores was
calculated to express Linguistic comprehension skills, while
the average of Naming and Sentence Repetition scores was
meant to express linguistic production skills.
The characteristics of the two groups of participants are
reported in Tables 1 and 2.
2.3. Materials and Procedure. Concreteness indices were
extracted from story-telling recordings. Narratives were
elicited using the wordless picture book “Frog, Where Are
You?” [75], already successfully used to tap into typical and
atypical complex language development [76, 77]. Participants
were first informed that theywould be asked to tell a story and
then invited to look through the entire booklet and finally to
tell the story, again while looking at the pictures. The exact
instructions provided by the experimenter were as follows:
“here is a book: this book tells a story about a boy, a dog
and a frog (pointing to the picture on the cover). First I want
you to look at all the pictures. Pay attention to each picture,
try to understand what happens, afterwards you will see the
pictures again and you will tell the story” ([76]; p. 22). Partic-
ipants had no time limit to look through the story. All stories
were recorded on a digital recorder, transcribed, and finally
coded in CHILDES format [78]. In the first analysis closed-
class words, adverbs and auxiliaries were excluded from the
story, while verbs were all coded in their infinitival form.
The whole list of words used by the participants was
subsequently rated by 20 adult native speakers for concrete-
ness, on 1 (totally abstract) to 7 (totally concrete) scale. Two
sets of words were created using a dichotomized code where
the words rated 4 or lower were treated as abstract while
words rated higher than 4 were considered to be concrete.
Finally, a general index of concreteness of language was
calculated by expressing the percentage of concrete words
over the total number of words (e.g., a subject that produced
7 concrete words over a total of 10 words had a percentage of
70%). This procedure allows controlling for the discrepancy
in number of uttered words between the DS group and
the WS group, as individuals with Williams Syndrome are
generally more talkative with respect to individuals with
Down Syndrome. According to this measure, participants
with lower indices present a more extensive use of abstract
words than participants with higher indices.
First, we used two-tailed 𝑡-tests to compare WS to DS
participants matched one-to-one on the basis of chrono-
logical age (±6 months). Then, a second analysis matched
participants one-to-one on MA (±6 months). Finally, each
atypically developing group was tested against typically
developing peers. A correlation analysis using Pearson’s 𝑟
was also carried out in order to investigate the relationship
between linguistic components measured by the linguistics
tests and concreteness indices. Throughout, 𝑝 values ≤ 0.05
were considered significant.
3. Results
Ten subjects from each atypically developing group were
included in the first analysis (see Tables 1 and 2, column a).
DS participants had a mean CA of 14.1, SD = 3.1, range 8
to 17 years; WS had a mean CA of 13.7, SD = 2.8, range 8.2
to 17.6 years. Performance of the WS group was significantly,
or marginally significantly, better on all indices compared to
performance in the DS group: lexical-semantic, 𝑡(18) = 1.91,
𝑝 = 0.07, 𝑑 = 1.294; syntactic, 𝑡(18) = 3.07, 𝑝 = 0.01,
𝑑 = 1.665; comprehension 𝑡(18) = 2.01, 𝑝 = 0.06, 𝑑 =
1.251; production, 𝑡(18) = 2.21, 𝑝 = 0.04, 𝑑 = 1.401.
No correction for multiple comparisons had been applied
in this analysis, being all variables correlated and being all
differences expected based on the characteristics of the two
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clinical groups. Moreover, WS participants had significantly
lower concreteness indices (M = 65.02, SD = 4.65) than DS
participants (M= 72.69, SD = 5.89) (𝑡(18) = −2.31,𝑝 = 0.033,
𝑑 = 1.445).
In order to control for the difference in general cognitive
skills of participants with Down Syndrome with respect to
participants with Williams Syndrome, the second analysis
matched participants of the two groups one-to-one on MA
(±6months). Ten participants were selected from each group
(see Tables 1 and 2, column b) (DS: mean MA = 6.6, SD =
1.3, range 4.3 to 8.3 years; WS: mean MA = 6.6, SD = 1.4,
range 3.8 to 8.2 years). In this case, performance of the WS
group compared to the DS group was significantly better on
syntactic indices only: 𝑡(18) = 2.67, 𝑝 = 0.02, 𝑑 = 1.794.
The pairwise comparison showed that WS participants had a
significantly lower concreteness index (M = 65.25, SD = 6.3)
than DS participants (M = 73.46, SD = 4.57): 𝑡(18) = −2.82,
𝑝 = 0.01, 𝑑 = 1.492.
In order to test whether the differences in the proportion
of concrete words used by the two groups in narrative
production could be ascribed to specific neuropsychological
characteristics of atypically developing populations, however
unrelated to the discrepancy between linguistic and visual-
spatial abilities, DS and WS participants were separately
compared to typically developing children of a similarmental
age. As a larger number of narratives had been collected from
TDchildren, it was possible to include all DS (except one) and
WS participants in the analyses.
In the first analysis, 16 DS participants (mean age 13.4,
DS = 3.5, range 8 to 18.3 years) were compared with 16
TD children (mean age 6, DS = 1.3, range 4.2 to 8 years).
The pairwise comparison revealed that DS participants have
significantly higher concreteness indices (M = 73.41, SD =
6.53) than TD children (M = 68.02, SD = 8.9) (𝑡(30) = 2.65,
𝑝 = 0.01, 𝑑 = .69).
The second analysis compared 13 WS participants (mean
age 12.9, DS = 4, range 7.11 to 18.5 years) with 13 TD
children (mean age 6.4, DS = 2, range 4.1 to 9.42 years). This
comparison did not show any significant difference between
the two groups (𝑡(24) = −0.6, n.s.).
A correlation analysis was also carried out in order to
investigate the relationship between linguistic components
measured by linguistic tests and general concreteness indices.
Pearson correlation indices were computed for linguistic
variables including lexical-semantic components, syntactic
components, comprehension, and production. Separate anal-
yses for DS, WS, and TD participants did not reveal any cor-
relation with concreteness (possibly due to limited number
of participants). However, when including all participants in
the analysis (𝑛 = 60), a negative correlation emerges between
concreteness and both comprehension (𝑟 = −.315;𝑝 = 0.008)
and syntactic components (𝑟 = −.248; 𝑝 = 0.041). No other
correlations reached statistical significance.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to compare lexical concrete-
ness levels in the narratives of clinical populations known to
have particularly marked deficits in either language (Down
Syndrome) or visual-spatial skills (Williams Syndrome), in
order to determine whether linguistic as opposed to visual-
spatial processes play a crucial role in the acquisition of
abstract knowledge. For this purpose, story-telling record-
ings produced by individuals with Williams Syndrome and
by individuals with Down Syndrome were compared with
respect to the proportion of concrete and abstract words.
Statistical analyses revealed that WS participants present,
overall, a more extensive use of abstract words than DS
participants, whether they are of comparable chronological
age or of comparable mental age. This finding favors the
hypothesis that the development of abstract knowledge is
based on linguistic skills, such as the extraction of regularities
from linguistic input [22]. Clearly, an advantage for individ-
uals with Williams Syndrome in the use of abstract language
is only possible if their (weak) [37] visual-spatial system is
not crucially or only marginally involved in the acquisition of
abstract concepts. On the other hand, the idea that abstract
concepts are learned through the process of extracting sta-
tistical regularities from language is confirmed by the fact
that participants with DS, who are characterized by a more
severe linguistic impairment [52], present a more concrete
language with respect to both WS participants (either paired
on CA or MA) and TD children of the same general MA
(thus presumably expressing an average of slightly worse
visual-spatial abilities and slightly better linguistic skills).
This extends previous findings about specific impairments in
DS concerning function words [57] or relational terms [56]
to the more general class of abstract words.
The tendency of individuals with Williams Syndrome
to learn and use low-frequency terms (e.g., [46]) may con-
tribute to the differences described in the present study, as
abstract words are in general less frequent than concrete
ones. However, the atypical frequency effects observed in
children with Williams Syndrome have been explained by
some authors as a particular sensitivity to the morphological
formal structure of words [79], by others as a dissociation
of enhanced phonological representations and poor lexical-
semantic representations [80, 81], or a dissociation of intact
combinatory and rule-governed grammatical skills and poor
fine-grained lexical-semantic specifications [82]. Laing et
al. [63] addressed this issue as related to verbal memory
and concluded that the processing of semantic aspects of
vocabulary is rather well developed in individuals with WS.
The present results, together with these studies, appear to
support a linguistic explanation for the advantage ofWilliams
Syndromeparticipants in the use of abstractwords, even if the
exact contribution of formal and semantic aspects of abstract
word acquisition (and use) should be further investigated.
We would not argue that visual-spatial abilities do not
play any role in building and processing abstract concepts.
Sensory-motor experiences associated with the acquisition
and representation of abstract concepts might be retrieved
and reactivated (or simulated, according to some concep-
tualizations of embodied cognition) any time the concept
is accessed [83, 84]. However, impairment at the visual-
spatial level does not significantly hinder the acquisition or
use of abstract concepts, as demonstrated by the absence
of significant differences between individuals with Williams
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Syndrome and typically developing children of the same
mental age. This also confirms, albeit indirectly so, the
predominant involvement of left anterior areas (the most
preserved in WS [61]), and possibly of the cerebellum, in the
development of abstract language, whereas better functioning
right hemisphere structures as found in DS [62] seem to
be less crucial in these terms. Such a pattern of results is
consistent with Paivio’s dual coding theory [12, 13] and with
other studies suggesting that abstract concepts are mainly
represented in the left hemisphere [28, 29, 36].
Finally, the analysis of correlational patterns provides
some insight into the nature of linguistic skills and processes
involved in abstract concept acquisition and use. Although
emerging onlywhen pooling all participants together (a likely
statistical power issue), it appears that the linguistic skills
more directly involved in the acquisition of abstract concepts
are to be found in the syntactic rather than in the lexical-
semantic components and in comprehension rather than in
production.This is compatible with the hypothesis suggesting
that the crucial process of the extraction of regularities in
input language can also be seen as the basis of syntactic
competence (e.g., [19, 22, 85]). Moreover, it is consistent with
previous studies showing that comprehension abilities are
predictive of production performance [58]. The whole set
of results, thus, points to linguistic abilities, including those
that involve the analysis of the syntactic structure in input,
as an important basis for building and representing abstract
knowledge. This also appears consistent with recent results
from various types of studies [86, 87].
5. Conclusions
One of the assumptions of the study was that specific
difficulties in either the linguistic or the visual-spatial domain
would interfere with the acquisition of abstract concepts and
that this disadvantage would be evident in the linguistic
production of children with genetic syndromes especially
affecting the verbal or the visual-spatial domain. What is
clear from the outcomes of the study is that the interference
from linguistic impairments is significant, in contrast to
interference from visual-spatial impairments. Whether this
interference occurs in the very early stages of conceptual
development, or at a later stage of abstract knowledge
development, such as the construction of semantic networks
including the abstract nodes or the reactivation of previously
stored information, is an interesting question that may
deserve further investigation.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors report no conflicts of interest.
Acknowledgments
The research was supported by the European Union (FP6-
2004-NEST-PATH), Grant no. 28714.
References
[1] J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Rout-
ledge, London, UK, 1690.
[2] S. Laurence and E. Margolis, “Concepts and cognitive science,”
in Concepts: Core Readings, E. Margolis and S. Laurence, Eds.,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 1999.
[3] S. Pinker, Language Learnability and Language Development,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 1984.
[4] G. L. Murphy and D. L. Medin, “The role of theories in
conceptual coherence,” Psychological Review, vol. 92, no. 3, pp.
289–316, 1985.
[5] E. Rosch, C. B. Mervis, W. D. Gray, D. M. Johnson, and P.
Boyes-Braem, “Basic objects in natural categories,” Cognitive
Psychology, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 382–439, 1976.
[6] P. C. Quinn and P. D. Eimas, “The emergence of category
representations during infancy: are separate perceptual and
conceptual processes required?” Journal of Cognition andDevel-
opment, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 55–61, 2000.
[7] P. C.Quinn andP.D. Eimas, “A reexamination of the perceptual-
to-conceptual shift in mental representations,” Review of Gen-
eral Psychology, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 271–287, 1997.
[8] P. D. Eimas and P. C. Quinn, “Studies on the formation of
perceptually based basic-level categories in young infants,”
Child Development, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 903–917, 1994.
[9] J.M.Mandler, “Perceptual and conceptual processes in infancy,”
Journal of Cognition and Development, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–36,
2000.
[10] J. M. Mandler and L. McDonough, “Concept formation in
infancy,” Cognitive Development, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 291–318, 1993.
[11] P. Bloom,HowChildren Learn theMeaning ofWords,MITPress,
Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2000.
[12] A. Paivio, Imagery and Verbal Processes, Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1971.
[13] A. Paivio, Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1986.
[14] P. Schwanenflugel, “Contextual constraint and lexical process-
ing,” in Understanding Word and Sentence, G. B. Simpson, Ed.,
Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1991.
[15] P. Schwanenflugen and E. J. Shoben, “Different context effects
in the comprehension of abstract and concrete verbal material,”
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and
Cognition, vol. 9, pp. 82–102, 1983.
[16] K. Wiemer-Hastings and X. Xu, “Content differences for
abstract and concrete concepts,” Cognitive Science, vol. 29, no.
5, pp. 719–736, 2005.
[17] S. J. Crutch and E. K. Warrington, “Abstract and concrete con-
cepts have structurally different representational frameworks,”
Brain, vol. 128, no. 3, pp. 615–627, 2005.
[18] S. Pinker, Learnability and Cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass, USA, 1989.
[19] L. Gleitman, “The structural sources of verb meanings,” Lan-
guage Acquisition, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–55, 1990.
[20] N. Akhtar and L. Montague, “Early lexical acquisition: The role
of cross-situational learning,” First Language, vol. 19, no. 57, pp.
347–358, 1999.
[21] R. S. Klibanoff and S. R. Waxman, “Basic level object categories
support the acquisition of novel adjectives: Evidence from
preschool-aged children,” Child Development, vol. 71, no. 3, pp.
649–659, 2000.
BioMed Research International 7
[22] K. Plunkett, “Theories of early language acquisition,” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 146–153, 1997.
[23] B. Landau and L. R. Gleitman, Language and Experience:
Evidence from the Blind Child, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass, USA, 1985.
[24] C. Fisher, “Structural limits on verb mapping: The role of
abstract structure in 2.5-year-olds’ interpretations of novel
verbs,” Developmental Science, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 55–64, 2002.
[25] L. W. Barsalou, “Grounded cognition,” Annual Review of Psy-
chology, vol. 59, pp. 617–645, 2008.
[26] J. Feldman and S. Narayanan, “Embodied meaning in a neural
theory of language,” Brain and Language, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 385–
392, 2004.
[27] M. Wilson, “Six views of embodied cognition,” Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 625–636, 2002.
[28] J. Wang, J. A. Conder, D. N. Blitzer, and S. V. Shinkareva,
“Neural representation of abstract and concrete concepts: A
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies,”HumanBrainMapping,
vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 1459–1468, 2010.
[29] C. J. Fiebach and A. D. Friederici, “Processing concrete words:
fMRI evidence against a specific right-hemisphere involve-
ment,” Neuropsychologia, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 62–70, 2004.
[30] W. K. Simmons, S. B. Hamann, C. L. Harenski, X. P. Hu, and L.
W. Barsalou, “fMRI evidence for word association and situated
simulation in conceptual processing,”The Journal of Physiology,
vol. 102, no. 1–3, pp. 106–119, 2008.
[31] C. D.Wilson-Mendenhall,W. K. Simmons, A.Martin, and L.W.
Barsalou, “Contextual processing of abstract concepts reveals
neural representations of nonlinguistic semantic content,” Cog-
nitive Neuroscience, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 920–935, 2013.
[32] J. R. Binder, C. F.Westbury, K. A.McKiernan, E. T. Possing, and
D. A. Medler, “Distinct brain systems for processing concrete
and abstract concepts,” Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 17, no. 6, pp.
905–917, 2005.
[33] J. R. Binder, “Effects of word imageability on semantic access:
neuroimaging studies,” inNeural Basis of Semantic Memory, M.
A. Kraut and J. Hart, Eds., pp. 149–181, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
[34] D. S. Sabsevitz, D. A. Medler, M. Seidenberg, and J. R. Binder,
“Modulation of the semantic system by word imageability,”
NeuroImage, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 188–200, 2005.
[35] E. K. Warrington and T. Shallice, “Category specific semantic
impairments,” Brain, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 829–854, 1984.
[36] S. Franklin, D. Howard, and K. Patterson, “Abstract word
anomia,” Cognitive Neuropsychology, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 549–566,
1995.
[37] C. B. Mervis and B. F. Robinson, “Expressive vocabulary ability
of toddlers with Williams syndrome or down syndrome: a
comparison,” Developmental Neuropsychology, vol. 17, no. 1, pp.
111–126, 2000.
[38] E.K. Farran andC. Jarrold, “Visuo-spatial cognition inWilliams
syndrome: reviewing and accounting for the strengths and
weaknesses in performance,” Developmental Neuropsychology,
vol. 23, pp. 175–202, 2003.
[39] C. B. Mervis and A. M. Becerra, “Language and communicative
development in Williams syndrome,” Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, vol. 13, no. 1, pp.
3–15, 2007.
[40] V. Joffe and S. Varlokosta, “Language abilities in Williams syn-
drome: exploring comprehension, production and repetition
skills,” International Journal of Speech-Language Pathology, vol.
9, no. 3, pp. 213–225, 2007.
[41] E. Semel and S. R. Rosner, Understanding Williams Syndrome:
Behavioral Patterns and Interventions, Lawrence ErlbaumAsso-
ciates, Mahwah, NJ, USA, 2003.
[42] S. Vicari, M. C. Caselli, C. Gagliardi, F. Tonucci, and V. Volterra,
“Language acquisition in special populations: A comparison
between Down and Williams syndromes,” Neuropsychologia,
vol. 40, no. 13, pp. 2461–2470, 2002.
[43] U. Bellugi and M. George, Journey from Cognition to Brain to
Gene. Perspectives from Williams Syndrome, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2001.
[44] J. Brock, C. Jarrold, E. K. Farran, G. Laws, and D. M. Riby, “Do
children with Williams syndrome really have good vocabulary
knowledge? Methods for comparing cognitive and linguistic
abilities in developmental disorders,” Clinical Linguistics &
Phonetics, vol. 21, no. 9, pp. 673–688, 2007.
[45] A. Meyer-Lindenberg, C. B. Mervis, and K. Faith Berman,
“Neural mechanisms in Williams syndrome: a unique window
to genetic influences on cognition and behaviour,” Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 380–393, 2006.
[46] S. Vicari, G. Carlesimo, D. Brizzolara, and G. Pezzini, “Short-
term memory in children with Williams syndrome: a reduced
contribution of lexical-semantic knowledge to word span,”
Neuropsychologia, vol. 34, no. 9, pp. 919–925, 1996.
[47] C. B. Mervis and C. A. Morris, “Williams syndrome,” in Neuro-
genetic Developmental Disorders: Variation of Manifestation in
Childhood, M. M. Mazzocco and J. L. Ross, Eds., pp. 199–262,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2007.
[48] V. Walsh, “A theory of magnitude: common cortical metrics of
time, space and quantity,”Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 7, no.
11, pp. 483–488, 2003.
[49] D. Gibson, Down’s Syndrome: The Psychology of Mongolism,
Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1978.
[50] B. P. Klein and C. B. Mervis, “Contrasting patterns of cognitive
abilities of 9- and 10-year-olds with Williams syndrome or
Down syndrome,” Developmental Neuropsychology, vol. 16, no.
2, pp. 177–196, 1999.
[51] P. P. Wang, S. Doherty, S. B. Rourke, and U. Bellugi, “Unique
profile of visuo-perceptual skills in a genetic syndrome,” Brain
and Cognition, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 54–65, 1995.
[52] G. Laws and D. V. M. Bishop, “A comparison of language
abilities in adolescents with Down syndrome and children with
specific language impairment,” Journal of Speech, Language, and
Hearing Research, vol. 46, no. 6, pp. 1324–1339, 2003.
[53] M. C. Levorato, M. Roch, and R. Beltrame, “Text comprehen-
sion in Down syndrome: the role of lower and higher level
abilities,”Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 285–
300, 2009.
[54] A. E. Fowler, “Language abilities in children with Down syn-
drome: Evidence for a specific syntactic delay,” in Children with
Down Syndrome: A Developmental Perspective, D. Cicchetti and
M. Beeghly, Eds., CambridgeUniverisity Press, Cambridge,UK,
1990.
[55] R. S. Chapman and L. J. Hesketh, “Behavioral phenotype of
individuals with down syndrome,” Developmental Disabilities
Research Reviews, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 84–95, 2000.
[56] G. Miolo, R. S. Chapman, and H. A. Sindberg, “Sentence com-
prehension in adolescents with Down syndrome and typically
developing children: Role of sentence voice, visual context,
and auditory-verbal short-term memory,” Journal of Speech,
Language, andHearing Research, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 172–188, 2005.
8 BioMed Research International
[57] R. S. Chapman,H. K. Seung, S. E. Schwartz, and E. Kay-Raininh
Bird, “Language skills of children and adolescents with Down
syndrome: II. Production deficits,” Journal of Speec, Language
and Hearing Research, vol. 41, pp. 861-73, 1998.
[58] R. S. Chapman, H. K. Seung, S. E. Schwartz, and E. Kay-
Raininh Bird, “Predicting language production in children and
adolescents with Down syndrome: the role of comprehension,”
Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, vol. 43, pp.
340-50, 2000.
[59] E. A. Bates, “Explaining and interpreting deficits in language
development across clinical groups: Where do we go from
here?” Brain and Language, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 248–253, 2004.
[60] D. A. Trauner, U. Bellugi, and C. Chase, “Neurologic features of
Williams and Down syndromes,” Pediatric Neurology, vol. 5, no.
3, pp. 166–168, 1989.
[61] A. L. Reiss, S. Eliez, J. E. Schmitt et al., “Neuroanatomy of
Williams syndrome: a high-resolution MRI study,” in Linking
Cognitive Neuroscience and Molecular Genetics: New Perspec-
tives fromWilliams Syndrome, U. Bellugi andM. StGeorge, Eds.,
MIT Press, 2006.
[62] N. S. White, M. T. Alkire, and R. J. Haier, “A voxel-based mor-
phometric study of nondemented adultswithDownSyndrome,”
NeuroImage, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 393–403, 2003.
[63] E. Laing, J. Grant, M. Thomas, C. Parmigiani, S. Ewing, and
A. Karmiloff-Smith, “Love is... an abstract word: the influence
of lexical semantics on verbal short-term memory in Williams
syndrome,” Cortex, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 169–179, 2005.
[64] K. E. Squires, M. J. Lugo-Neris, E. D. Peña, L. M. Bedore, T. M.
Bohman, and R. B. Gillam, “Story retelling by bilingual children
with language impairments and typically developing controls,”
International Journal of Language & Communication Disorders,
vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 60–74, 2014.
[65] H. Tager-Flusberg and K. Sullivan, “Attributing mental states to
story characters: a comparison of narratives produced by autis-
tic andmentally retarded individuals,”Applied Psycholinguistics,
vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 241–256, 1995.
[66] A.-L. Rumpf, I. Kamp-Becker, K. Becker, and C. Kauschke,
“Narrative competence and internal state language of children
with Asperger Syndrome andADHD,”Research in Developmen-
tal Disabilities, vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 1395–1407, 2012.
[67] D. Wechsler, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—Revised,
Organizzazioni Speciali, Firenze, Italy, 1986.
[68] A. Orsini, WISC-R: Contribution to Italian Norms, Organiz-
zazioni Speciali, Firenze, Italy, 1997.
[69] L. M. Dunn, L. M. Dunn, C. Whetton, and D. Pintilie, British
Picture Vocabulary Scale. Short Form, NFER-Nelson, Berkshire,
UK, 1982.
[70] M. de Agostini, M.-N. Metz-Lutz, A. van Hout et al., “Batterie
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